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From Diversity Management to Alterity Politics: 
Qualifying Otherness 
Maddy Janssens & Chris Steyaert 
 
Executive Summary 
 
The diversity domain seems currently in a struggle, having critical debates about the future 
direction of diversity studies as well as diversity programs and actions.  It seems to have 
neglected theoretical reflections on notions of ‘diversity,’ ‘difference,’ or the ‘other.’  The 
purpose of this paper is to think theoretically about diversity, arguing that it is the thinking 
itself that has to become different and that a different thinking will make a difference in 
addressing policies and actions.  The main point we try to make is that diversity is not a 
matter of constructing identities but of a moving alterity.   
 We will depart from the current debates in diversity management, in which we identify 
mainly four issues: a narrow or broad definition of diversity, a stable or dynamic conception 
of identity, the role of power, and the importance of the socio-historical context.  With the 
discussion of these four issues, we will try to indicate the implicit ‘theoretical’ choices 
prioritizing the concept of ‘identity’, turning the issues of diversity into a managing of 
individuals and ‘their’ identities.  Rather than pursuing the route of identity, we try to explore 
another route, paving a possible way of conceiving the other from the position of the other 
and not from fixed norms and possibilities.  We therefor turn to the concept of ‘alterity.’   
The aim of the paper is then to develop an alterity-thinking by connecting and relating to 
the philosophical work of Deleuze and Guattari, and Serres; the writings of Collins on the 
Black-feminist standpoint, and recent political studies on democracy.  The qualifications that 
we connect and associate to alterity, are: its relation to an ontology of becoming, its crossing 
out of the identifiable into becoming anonymous, its dependence on safe, social-cultural 
spaces, and on open, empty public spaces.  To conclude, we reflect on the different ways in 
which this alterity-thinking is related to the four critical issues of the diversity literature and 
discuss its qualifications as possible conditions for what we might sum up as an ‘alterity 
politics.’ 
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From Diversity Management to Alterity Politics:  
Qualifying Otherness 
 
Individuals and Identities in Diversity Literature  
 
Studies on diversity seem to have a two-fold purpose.  A first purpose is to identify 
discriminatory practices in the workplace.  Several studies have examined the working 
experiences of minority groups, inducing our attention to phenomena such as the glass-
ceiling effect (e.g. Cox & Nkomo, 1990; Wirth, 2001), wage differences (e.g. Ashraf, 
1996; Blau & Beller, 1988), segregation (e.g. Anker, 1998; Ibarra, 1995).  A second 
purpose is to examine the effects of diversity on work-related outcomes.  For instance, 
studies (for a review see Milliken & Martins, 1996) have examined the relationship between 
value diversity and conflict, or between cognitive heterogeneity and problem-solving 
capabilities.  Wanting to achieve one (or both) of the two purposes, the domain has mainly 
focused on the consequences of diversity and seems to have neglected theoretical reflections 
on the notions of ‘diversity,’ ‘difference,’ or the ‘other.’  This need for theorizing has been 
indicated by well-known scholars in the field (e.g. Cox, 1995; Nkomo, 1995; 2000; 
Nkomo & Cox, 1996), concerned about the continuation of the diversity domain.   
 Currently, the domain seems to be in a struggle, having critical debates about the future 
direction of ‘diversity studies’ and how theorizing and concept-development can play a role 
in this.  Also in ‘practice’-contexts, one can notice a call for conceptualization and reframing.  
As there is an inflation of diversity programs, of legal measures and social strategies, the 
everyday reality of dealing with and changing diversity-issues is one of ‘things are easier said 
than done.’  The experience is that every action proposal has always a political implication 
and that even the way one talks and thinks about problems and solutions can already be 
sensitive.  Though the value of structural, legal and cultural interventions has been 
recognized, many critical comments have simultaneously been raised (Harris, 1997; 
Roosevelt Thomas, 1990). Furthermore, HRM-practices such as recruitment and training as 
a way to manage diversity seem to have a rather limited impact, not capable of changing 
social relations and cultural values.  One could suggest that using ‘old’ and well-known 
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methods makes diversity equally into an ‘old’ problem that is not really given a change to be 
looked and listened at with fresh ‘theoretical’ eyes (Thomas & Ely, 1996). 
Therefor, we will in this article take a step back, and take the time to think theoretically 
about diversity, arguing that it is the thinking itself that has to become different and that a 
different thinking will make a difference in addressing policies and actions.  The main point 
we try to make is that diversity is not a matter of constructing identities but of a moving 
alterity.  Following this line of thinking, we question whether diversity can be approached 
policy-wise as a ‘management’ and propose to address it as a ‘politics.’  For this, we will 
depart from the current debates in diversity management, in which we identify mainly four 
issues: a narrow or broad definition of diversity, a stable or dynamic conception of identity, 
the role of power, and the importance of the socio-historical context.  With the discussion of 
these four issues, we will try to indicate the implicit ‘theoretical’ choices prioritizing the 
concept of ‘identity’, turning the issues of diversity into a managing of individuals and ‘their’ 
identities.  Consequently, it is argued that the recent criticisms on the identity-concept (and 
its policy) as a view through which the other is understood in terms of its similarities with the 
self, shortcutting the notion of difference and implying that one’s development is based on 
lack, also apply to diversity management and linger in policy-proposals and actions.  Rather 
than pursuing the route of identity, we try to explore another route, paving a possible way of 
conceiving the other from the position of the other and not from fixed norms and 
possibilities.  We will refer to the concept of ‘alterity’ for this, but our aim is not to erase 
‘identity’ and then simply replace it by ‘some other concept.’  Rather, we want to stimulate 
the thinking and conceiving through a centrifugal force that alters the thinking and conceiving 
itself (instead of proposing a centripetalling concept).  The purpose of the paper is then to 
develop this thinking by connecting and relating to the philosophical work of Deleuze and 
Guattari, and Serres; the writings of Collins on the Black-feminist standpoint, and recent 
political studies on democracy.  The qualifications that we connect and associate to alterity, 
are: its relation to an ontology of becoming, its crossing out of the identifiable into becoming 
anonymous, its dependence on safe, social-cultural spaces, and on open, empty public 
spaces.  To conclude, we reflect on the different ways in which this alterity-thinking is 
related to the four critical issues of the diversity literature and discuss its qualifications as 
possible conditions for what we might sum up as an ‘alterity politics.’ 
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Critical debates in the diversity literature  
A first, central, question within diversity literature is whether diversity should be narrowly or 
broadly defined (Nkomo, 1995).  Scholars favoring a narrow definition argue that the 
domain of diversity research should be restricted to specific cultural categories such as race 
and gender (e.g. Cross, Katz, Miller & Seashore, 1994; Morrison, 1992).  On the other 
hand, scholars preferring a broad definition (e.g. Jackson, May & Whitney, 1995; Thomas, 
1991) argue that diversity encompasses all the possible ways people can differ.  Individuals 
do not only differ because of their race, gender, age and other demographic categories but 
also because of their values, abilities, organizational function, tenure and personality.   
 Those favoring a narrow perspective argue that diversity based upon race, ethnicity and 
gender can not be understood in the same way as diversity based upon organizational 
functions, abilities or cognitive orientations (Nkomo, 1995).  Differences due to 
organizational function or to gender have different effects and therefore, they need to be 
distinguished.  One further stresses that the key issues of diversity are those that arise 
because of discrimination and exclusion of cultural groups from traditional organizations 
(Cross et al., 1994; Morrison, 1992).  If diversity is a concept that is inclusive to all 
individuals, it will become very difficult to identify discrimination practices.  The main 
concern of this perspective is that a broad definition may imply that all differences among 
people are the same.  Diversity studies would then only reach the reductionistic conclusion 
that ‘everyone is different’ and, if this conclusion is accepted, the concept of diversity may 
become “nothing more than a benign, meaningless concept” (Nkomo, 1995, p. 248).   
 The risk of the narrow approach, however, is that research usually focuses only at one 
dimension at a time (race or gender) and that one fails to recognize the interactions with 
other dimensions.  Those favoring a broad definition argue that an individual has multiple 
identities and that the multiple dimensions can not be isolated in an organizational setting.  
Individuals bring not only their race and gender but also their particular knowledge, 
personality, and cognitive style to the work setting.  If diversity literature wants to 
understand the dynamics of a heterogeneous workforce, it needs to address the interactive 
effects of multidimensional diversity.  Broadly defining diversity is further considered crucial 
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to prevent the domain of diversity of falling apart into separate subdomains.  Having a broad 
understanding of all types of differences is seen as helpful to understand one’s own research 
better, without necessarily arguing that all differences are equivalent.  Another argument 
favoring a broad definition refers to the potential positive effect on diversity programs.  The 
expectation is that diversity management will become more acceptable if it is not only 
oriented towards specific groups of employees but if it is inclusive to all employees (Thomas, 
1991).   
 A second issue in the debates refers to a stable or dynamic conception of identity.  
Relying on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), several diversity 
studies link individuals’ identity directly to the social category they belong to on the basis of 
their individual characteristics.  For instance, a person is being identified as ‘a woman’ if she 
belongs to the social category of women.  The reasoning is that people categorize 
themselves and others on the basis of how closely their individual characteristics match the 
prototypes of various groups.  Such a categorization process is not merely a cognitive 
process but is followed by an identification process with affective and evaluative 
components (Tajfel, 1982).  According to this perspective, a person’s identity is conceived 
as stable, fixed, unitary and internally consistent.  It is an objective set of characteristics, 
which leads to a specific identity.  The view on the self can be considered as autonomous, as 
“a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe… organized 
into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against other such wholes and against a social 
and natural background” (Geertz, 1979, p. 229). 
 Other researchers however favor a reframing of identity toward relational embeddedness 
(Shotter & Gergen, 1989), where the concept of identity is not one of cross-time and cross-
situational coherence but one of multiphrenic embeddedness (Gergen, 1991).  From this 
perspective, identity is “best seen as a set of contradictory, fluid, contextual constrained 
positions within which people are capable of exercising choice” (Ely, 1995; p.184).  
Questions like ‘Who am I?’ or ‘What kind of person am I?’ are not answered once and for 
all, but are being constructed as social interactions and experiences change, not only over 
time, but also during the work day as one encounters a variety of people and situations.  
Important in this relational perspective is the fluid, processual nature of identity that is 
contingent upon social relations (Alvesson & Billing, 1997).  Behavior that was formerly 
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attributed to the individual alone is now seen as arising out of the negotiated relationship with 
other individuals.  Even if people belong to the same social category, the meaning of their 
identity is not necessarily the same because they develop their identity in close interaction 
with other people who confirm, support or disrupt different identity claims.  A person may 
see herself as a result-oriented manager as well as a loving mother and a politically 
conservative voter.  Identities are dynamic, multiple and contextual.  From this relational 
perspective, the question of ‘Who am I?’ opens up a world of multiple possibilities.   
 The discussion on the concept of identity as relational and contextual brings the diversity 
literature to two other issues e.g. power and the socio-historical context as two important 
factors that can create and re-create identity in potentially infinite ways.  Attention to these 
two factors is put forward mainly by scholars stressing the emancipatory purpose of 
diversity studies.  Especially those who take a narrow definition try to understand differences 
between people within structures of power inequalities and the socio-historical context.  
However, the danger of this approach lies in the assumption that it is only those in the 
oppressed position - women, people of color, … who constitute diversity.  It leads to 
phrases such as ‘the diverse group’ or ‘the diverse person’, implying that the condition of 
diversity inheres solely in members of oppressed groups: only people of color have a race, 
only women have a gender, and only gay, lesbian and bisexual people have a sexual 
orientation (Nkomo, 1992; Ely, 1995).  This assumption has also important consequences 
for formulating strategies of how to deal with diversity and identity.  If diversity is only a 
characteristic of a certain, oppressed group, then dealing with diversity means dealing 
‘correctly’ with oppressed groups.  For people in dominant positions, this means that they 
only need to change their perceptions of and behaviors towards those ‘others.’ As such, 
prescriptions for change require little of dominant groups in the way of self-reflection or 
addressing the inner workings or logic of oppressive mechanisms within the organisation.  
The danger of the notion of diversity as a set of attributes that reside in some people and not 
in others is that it leaves dominant groups fundamentally unchanged and relations of 
domination intact (Ely, 1995).  Ely (1995) therefore proposes an approach to diversity 
which places power at the center and which considers diversity as a certain condition of a 
relationship instead of a set of attributes.  She proposes to define diversity broadly, to 
distinguish people’s experiences into experiences of dominance and suppression, and to 
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explicitly study both.  By engaging multiple axes of identity - both dominant and oppressed - 
within each person, this approach may create the conditions for empathy among people who 
may otherwise feel frustrated with, guilty about, or angry toward one another.  Because such 
experiences are simultaneously present in each person, members of the dominant group do 
not have to feel frustration and guilt while members of the oppressed groups do not have to 
hold onto their position of being dominated.  As a result, people may engage more fully, 
more consciously, and more productively in their relationships and their work.   
 A fourth issue in the literature debates refers to the importance of the socio-historical 
context to fully understand the dynamics of diversity at the workplace (Cox, 1995; Triandis, 
1995).  Given the importance of intergroup dynamics for diversity, contemporary 
interactions are considered to be influenced by the legacy of prior interactions among 
members of those groups.  It is the history of intergroup relations, which is the social-cultural 
background on which the effects of diversity are constructed (Alderfer & Smith, 1982).  
This background includes not only an organizational, but also a societal component.  
Occupational roles tend to be segregated by race or by gender on the basis of assumptions 
about race- or gender-related competences, having their roots in the history of the labor 
market and in differences in educational opportunities.  Having more attention to the role of 
history would therefore help to understand how segregation phenomena and oppressed 
mechanisms function in organizations.  This implies that organizations reproduce rather than 
invent these mechanisms and are therefore reflections of the broader society.   
 
Diversity equals identity: Implied choices  
The above overview of the diversity-discussion might be considered a ‘wrong’ discussion.  
Wrong because it doesn’t fully address some fundamental conceptual choices, implicit but 
with far-reaching implications for diversity practices and interventions.  That is the main point 
of this text, namely to ‘question’, ‘shake’ and ‘change’ the conceptual preconditions and 
choices lingering in the four issues of ‘critical’ debate.  The question we pose is whether this 
debate is critical enough.  It seems as if a large part of the diversity discussions are tied up to 
the notion of ‘identity’: diversity equals identity.  As a consequence, a lot of subtle and 
difficult questions related to diversity are shortcut and reduced to a riddle of identity.  For 
instance, is the future direction of the diversity domain cared for when we say that people 
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‘have’ diverse characteristics, that they are ‘individuals’ having identities (even socially 
constructed), that they belong to ‘minority’ groups that are oppressed, and that we speak of 
‘organizations’ which repeat and mimic societal histories?  Debates on diversity seem 
inevitably to be debates about identities, which brings us to the need for a close examination 
of how we construct the whole diversity-identity debate.  We will enter some of the critics 
on the notion and the use of identity, as well as - in the next part - develop ‘other’ 
qualifications that might open up into multiple and differing conceptions of alterity and lead to 
other intervention conditions that renew our ways of dealing with people in organizations: 
diversity multiplies then alterity.  
 Identity politics in feminism and in other contemporary social movements refers to 
formulating and validating political claims on the basis that those making the claims share a 
certain social location as, say ‘lesbians,’ ‘black women,’ ‘people with disabilities’ 
(Cameron, 1998; Calhoun, 1994).  Part of the strengths the notion of identity and of identity 
politics lies in the fact that is sets out realistically accomplishable goals that are particular to 
groups of common interests.  However, identity politics seems on the defensive as the 
concept of identity is increasingly critized as narrow and ineffective in addressing the needs 
of those groups that have been marginalized by the rest of society (Lusane, 1996).   
 Identity politics, as the label suggests, centres on the idea of authentic, fixed identities.  
This is its strength because by narrowing the purview of emancipation it can set realistic 
goals.  Therein, however, lies also the problem.  Identity politics is in the impossibility to 
consider multiple subjectpositions as it centralizes certain forms of being namely the standard 
of something.  For example, first wave feminism has been accused of heterosexism and 
indifference to race.  Both lesbian and black women blame early feminism that their idea of 
‘a woman’ was the white middle class woman with no attention toward the differences 
among women.  In addressing this critique, Butler (1990, p. 143) points out that the list of 
adjectives referring to different social groups, color, sexuality, ethnicity, class and able-
bodiedness, invariably closes with an embarrassed ‘etc.’ at the end of the list.  It is through 
this horizontal trajectory of adjectives that one strives to encompass a situated subject, but 
invariably fails to be complete.  It is this inability to treat multiple subject positions, the 
inability to attend to more than one specific subject at a time - which has come to be an 
important critique of identity politics (Nealon, 1999).  Identity politics fails to recognize the 
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interactions among different characterizations and the possibilities of different identities within 
the same social category.  
 Another formulated critique is that identity politics is an attempt to thematize the other in 
terms of its similarities with the self.  Because any state of sameness actually requires 
difference in order to structure itself, identity requires difference in order to be.  It is this 
necessary dependence on difference for its own identity that has kept open a space for the 
other.  This realization comprises what Nealon (1999) calls the theoretical success of 
multiculturalism.  There is an increasing appreciation of differences and everybody seems to 
love the other.  However, at the same time, the realization of difference’s necessity hasn’t 
led to a significant increase in social respect and tolerance.   
 Both critiques bring Nealon (1999) to the formulation of the central critique that identity 
politics is a politics of lack.  The difference that is needed for the own identity is also 
always a difference-as-lack.  This thought that one can never complete one’s identity 
already assumes an ideal other that one wants to be but that one never can reach.  We need 
the other because we all have been excluded from the privileges of an ideal self.  And 
because we need each other for recognition and happiness; the needing the other often 
shows itself as resenting the other.  This resentment is for Nealon a symptom of a larger 
problem with an identity politics of lack.  The very notion of intersubjectivity is thought as 
lack implying that any specific lack or failure becomes a indication of a more generalized 
lack.  What we have in common is that we all lack in some way: “I can’t have everything - I 
lack completeness; I cannot be a positive term - so I live in/with the solace of others, who 
likewise lack such wholeness” (Nealon, 1999, p.5).  If the subject is no other than a 
symptom of a founding lack, its primary mode of agency is then directed toward making up 
for that lack.  Therefore, it is resentment, rather than collective resistance, which is the pre-
eminent social effect of the politics of lack.  As long as difference is understood in terms as 
the constant discovery of lack, one underestimates the hazardous productivity of difference’s 
specificity.  It is therefore that difference must be reinscribed outside the realm of loss, lack, 
or failure. Or in the words of Nealon (1999, p.3): every identity politics as a project is 
doomed to fail because every specific identity likewise fails to be complete. 
 
Shaping side-roads: Diversity multiplies alterity 
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For Nealon, the challenge is to work out a notion of difference as other than lack or failure 
of sameness for which he uses the term ‘alterity.’  Defining it, “the term ‘alterity’ is closely 
related to the concept of ‘othering’ and Foucault’s notion of the ‘exteriority’ or marginality 
of the subject.  Often thought of as synonymous with ‘Other’, the condition of alterity 
exemplifies the marginal or peripheral that does not have access to the centres of power.  
The centre (or centres) represent(s) a point of origin in which meaning is fixed and validated 
as the determining norm.  Those excluded from the centre by virtue of race, caste, gender or 
religion are categorised as irrelevant to normative conventions and designated ‘other’ ” 
(Gamble, 2000).   Considering the critical reception of the notion identity and how it 
shapes identity politics, we will depart from Nealon’s notion of alterity, and try to multiply its 
versions shaping side-roads that can alter our thinking about diversity.  The idea is to qualify 
alterity through relating with the other that does not merely return to the same and work out 
a notion of difference as other than lack or failure of sameness.  The concept of alterity 
implies a response first and foremost to the other.  Such a response does not respond to a 
problem or question, it responds to the other - for the other.  For Nealon (1999), 
subjectivity thought as lack seems to separate the subject from what it can do.  It thematizes 
the subject as an effect (a noun) rather than an effectivity (an action): “as long as identity is 
not thematized as a hazardous performative act - a verb rather than a noun, a multiple 
becoming rather than a monological symptom, a deployment of force rather than an assured 
process of mourning, it seems destined to remain a locus for resentment, naming itself always 
in terms of expropriation from an ideal that it can’t ever hope, and doesn’t even wish, to 
attain” (Nealon, 1999, p. 12).  Response to the other is, therefore, about action, about 
producing deeds and negotiations, not about mourning for a loss or lack.   
 
 
Qualifying Alterity/ Altering Otherness 
 
Our purpose now is to further conceive the notion of alterity.  How to qualify alterity and its 
conditions?  How to speak of otherness and difference, without immediately again fixing the 
other, without creating ideals by fixing possibilities (and repeating the same problems of 
identity)?  Is it possible to engage in an ‘open’ qualifying, to phrase (concepts) without 
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qualities?  Is there another way of conceiving other possible?  How to think of alterity that 
itself is becoming and multiplying?  Alterity is then not a well-defined fixpoint, but rather a 
traffic island or refuge for multiple visitors with diverse experiences, impressions and stories.  
There are many inspirations to connect (to), such as art, philosophy and the many so-called 
minority studies resisting dominant representations or resisting the act of representing tout 
court (see Janssens & Steyaert, 2001).  We relate here to the work of Deleuze (1995; 
1997/1993), Deleuze and Guattari (1987/1980; 1994), Serres (1995/1982), Collins (1991) 
and IJsseling (1999) and Lefort (1981). 
 
Becoming, multiplicity and becoming other 
Identity can be considered a notion of order.  It is a concept of structuring and constructing 
cohesion, even if, within a social constructionist frame, one conceives it relationally and 
embedded within multiple subjectpositions.  Becoming other is, however, first of all a 
becoming, a swimming following the ‘repetition’ of multiplicity, participating in the ongoing 
streams.  We connect here with the philosophical thinking of Deleuze (1995; 1997/1993), 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987/1980) and Serres (1995/1982).  Given our purpose of 
developing qualifications of alterity, we would like to stay close to their own texts and 
therefore present their thoughts by mainly quoting their own words.   
For Deleuze and Guattari (1987/1980), a person is an open multiplicity, a series that is 
open ended.  For a person on the move, it is a matter of keeping open possibilities, the 
ability for making ever-new connections.  Sometimes, we think to have reached a harbour, 
but soon enough we will find ourselves (thrown) back in an open sea (Deleuze, 1995).  
What counts, are the plural lines of flight that keep one’s life open.  Instead of through 
discipline and control, Deleuze and Guattari approach a life through creativity and pluralism.  
The other in ourselves, such as ‘being’ a woman, is not a feature to build upon one’s 
complete identity, no, it is rather a line of flight, through which a woman with all women and 
men, can become woman, a becoming-woman: “To become is not to attain a form 
(identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or 
indifferentation where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a 
molecule - neither imprecise nor general, but unforeseen and nonpreexistent, singularized out 
of a population rather than determined in a form” (Deleuze, 1997/1993, p.1).   
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This becoming-thinking implies unfinalizability.  A becoming is not a change between two 
states (contraptions) from a point of departure to a point of arrival, one is in the middle, 
experimenting without a destination.  One will never be, for instance, a woman or a gay, fully 
e-mancipated: one can not get ‘out’ of it.  The coming out of a gay is then exactly that, it is 
coming in the middle, in between, following the line of flight of gayness, and being taken by 
and within all the (im)possibilities.  And when one thinks to have reached a safe harbour 
(like equal wages for women or the right to marry for gays), one will soon be back in the 
open sea.  Becoming, a becoming cannot ‘have’ or ‘be’ a fixed identity, it is always a 
becoming-other, pure differences, multifications rather than uni-fication.  The multiplicity of 
becoming requires always escaping from the many accessible and accepted codings and 
overcodings, even one’s own name: “It’s a strange business, speaking for yourself, in your 
own name, because it doesn’t at all come with seeing yourself as an ego or a person or a 
subject.  Individuals find a real name for themselves, rather, only through the harshest 
exercise in depersonalization, by opening themselves up to the multiplicities everywhere 
within them, to the intensities running through them.  A name as the direct awareness of such 
intensive multiplicity is the opposite of the depersonalization effected by the history of 
philosophy; it’s depersonalization through love rather than subjection.  What one says comes 
from the depths of one’s own underdevelopment.  One becomes a set of liberated 
singularities, words, names, fingernails, things, animals, little events: quite the reverse of a 
celebrity” (Deleuze, 1995, p.6-7). 
 Deleuze and Guattari are here close to the work of Serres (1995/1982) in Genesis, 
where he takes noise as background of all geneses.  Noise is the multiple, multiplicity, chaos 
that is always there, invisible but unavoidable in things coming along.  Multiplicity can then be 
considered a leitmotiv in Genesis: “We were afraid of wind and water, we are now afraid of 
disorder and the rarely predictable.  In fact, we are afraid of multiplicities.  We never want 
to conceive multiplicity as such.  We run away from this thought” (Serres, 1995/1982, 
p.108).  The multiple has been locked out since we have been making boundaries, drawing 
lines and rounding off, establishing the individual (i.e. the immigrant), the organization (‘our 
company’) as a consequence of believing that being presupposes a unity: “I am trying here 
to raise the brackets and parentheses, syntheses, whereby we shove multiplicities under 
unities” (Serres, 1995/1982, p.4).  Serres (1995/1982; p.4) describes a route, very 
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poetically, from monadologies to nomadologies, though aware of the difficulty: “Can I 
possibly speak of multiplicity itself without ever availing myself of the concept?”  The 
multiple is not the aggregate (like a school, a heap or a pack) but more like “a like under the 
mist, the sea, a white plain, background noise, the murmur of a crowd, time” (Serres, 
1995/1982, p.5).   
For Serres, the way to ‘study’ the multiple is not by seeing but by hearing.  This is 
because: “by the ear, of course, I hear: temple, drum, pavilion, but also my entire body and 
the whole of my skin.  We are immersed in sound just as we are immersed in air and light, 
we are caught up willy-nilly in its hurly-burly” (Serres, 1995/1982; p. 7).  Images are 
sound-images, soundings.  Maybe we have been able to think multiplicity but not yet have 
we evoked its soundings.  Hearing always continues even if seeing has long before been 
halted.  Multiplicities - think of the sea - is not something you see but something you hear.  
We are immersed in noise as we are in air and light.  Noise is always there; it’s the material 
for all our forms.  What for, where to listen at: “The multiple is water, the sea: ‘Life, the 
mantle of life that covers me, the generative field of life in which I am only a singularity alive.  
A certain death at an uncertain hour.  Life, my life, work, my work, my labor, my project, 
this desert with or without a masterpiece, with or without any Mount Carmel summit.  Sea, 
forest, rumor, noise, society, life, works and days, all common multiples; we can hardly say 
they are objects, yet require a new way of thinking.  I’m trying to think the multiple as such, 
to let it waft along without arresting it through unity, to let it go, as it is, at its own pace.  A 
thousand slack algaes at the bottom of the sea.’ ” (Serres, 1995/1982, p.6).   
 Serres (1995/1982, p.31) conceives being as becoming, and plays literally with 
Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum”: “Who am I, beyond the joy coming from this shudder of 
awakening, the growth of this green ivy, this dancing flame, this living fire? I think in general, 
I am a capacity to think something, and I am virtual.  I think in general, I can think anything.  
I think, therefore I am indeterminate.  I think, therefore I am anyone.  A tree, a river, a 
number, an ivy, a fire, a reason or you, whatever.  Proteus.  I think, therefore I am Nobody.  
The I is nobody in particular, it is not a singularity, it has no contours, it is the blankness of all 
colors and all nuances, an open and translucent welcome of a multiplicity of thoughts, it is 
therefore I don not exist.  Who am I? A blank domino, a joker, that can take any value.  A 
pure capacity.  There is nothing more abstract.  I am just the plain whore of the thoughts that 
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accost me, I wait for them, morning and evening, at the crossroads, under the statue of the 
angel Hermes, all wind and all weather.  And, maybe, I am, maybe, if the verb to be is a 
joker or a blank domino, as well.” 
 Serres (1995/1982, p.22) connects the multiple to the possible: “The raucous, anarchic, 
noisy, variegated, tiger-stripped, zebra-streaked, jumbled-up, mixed-up multiple, criss-
crossed by myriad colors and myriad shades, is possibility itself.  It is a set of possible 
things, it may be the set of possible things.”  It goes beyond the status quo, beyond the idea 
that the world is a construction, perfect architecture.  Finished, but impossible to move.  A 
matter of fact.  Moving nor possibility.  What we need is the souplesse of a footprint, of a 
runner, of a dancer.  A philosopher is the guard of the possible, that is their care and 
passion, “to protect to the utmost the possible, he (?) tends the possible like a small child, he 
broods over it like a newborn babe, he is the guardian of the seed.  The philosopher is the 
shepherd who tends the mixed flock of possibles on the highlands, heavy ewes and 
shuddering bulls, the philosopher is a gardener, he crosses and multiplies varieties, (…) the 
philosopher is the shepherd of the multiplicities” (Serres, 1995/1982, p.23).  A philosopher 
is looking out for unpredictable and vulnerable conditions, with it’s own position moving 
along, unstable, mobile, and precarious.  Everything that is necessary to make the multiple 
possible and to multiply the possible.  I say, “There are other possible worlds, I know other 
possible meanings, we can invent other forms of time” (Serres, 1995/1982, p.25). 
Connecting to this philosophical work, we see a first side-path, a qualification of alterity 
as becoming, as multiplicity.  Becoming means then escaping from accepted codings and 
keeping open possibilities.  Multiplicity is connected to the possible where to become is not 
to attain a specific form but the ability to take any value.  A becoming is like an 
indeterminate person, a blank domino.  It implies also questioning the ever-emerging 
fixations that we ourselves and others are ready to use. Instead of ‘seeing things’, we hear 
waves. Rather than looking for the coherence of one’s life story, it requires stepping aside, 
and, even, doubting one’s name. 
 
Becoming other, becoming anonymous 
Identity thinking is all about being ‘someone.’  It tries to give names to all that what one is 
or, rather, should be: an ideal worker with this and that feature, with all the expected and 
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usual categories, and, now also, on top of that, all new features, from female sensitivity to 
exotic cultural backgrounds.  Against this race of ‘unicity’ - to which identity and being-
thinking lead - one could suggest becoming other is a matter of becoming anonymous.  From 
the above quotes by Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari, and Serres, we retain the idea that 
becoming is not the architectural activity of building or constructing identities, of ever 
becoming more out-spoken and developed as a person.  It is a step back, more modest. A 
step aside, also. It is the paradox that to be a person one has to become impersonal, 
anonymous.  One is open for the streams rather than that one tries to order or to stop them.  
Energy streams anyway and living is becoming -intensive.  It is about becoming indiscernible, 
a blade of grass between the grass.  The concept that Deleuze and Guattari use for this 
‘becoming-person’ is 'haeccité' translated as haeccity.  This ‘this-ness’ is a form of 
individuation that is different from that of person, a subject, or a thing.  Such as with a 
season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date, it is with a human not about the life, but a life, a 
set of accelerations and slownesses.  Instead of subjectivity where one always draws lines 
and becomes visible, individuation via haeccity is an alter-nating between movement and 
rest: “you have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life - a climate, a wind, a fog, a 
swarm, a pack.  Or at least you can have it, you can reach it” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987/1980, p.262).  Instead of having a personality as in a Western culture, an option is 
offered here of becoming individual among collective streams, as a form of anonymity.   
Deleuze and Guattari (1987/1980, p.263) give the example of Virginia Woolf, who in her 
life and work (what a distinction), always inscribed becomings: “Virginia Woolf’s walk 
through the crowd, among the taxis.  Taking a walk is a haecceity; never will Mrs. Dalloway 
say to herself, I am this, I am that, he is this, he is that.  And she felt very young; at the same 
time unspeakably aged.  She sliced like a knife through everything; at the same time was 
outside, looking on … She always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live 
even one day.  Haecceity, fog, glare.  A haecceity has neither beginning nor end, origin nor 
destination; it is always in the middle.  It is not made of points, only of lines.  It is a rhizome.”  
This becoming-in-between, in between times, sexes and elements is strikingly illustrated in 
her novel, Orlando, conceived itself as an in-between, as a writer’s holiday.  Orlando is 
both male and female, both in the 18th as in the 20th century.  Only at the end, Orlando 
freezes into a ‘human being’, but it makes her turn pale: “for what more terrifying revelation 
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can there be than it is the present moment?  That we survive the shock at all is only possible 
because the past shelters us on one side and the future on another” (Woolf, 1998).  Only 
then, some centuries later, she can not longer resist being, being a person with qualities 
(Steyaert, 1998).  
 Becoming other in the thinking of Deleuze and Guattari is then not a contribution to some 
identity theory but a way to conceive the becoming of minorities as a becoming-minority.  In 
Mille Plateaux, they refer to the context of black people.  Being black is not a feature one 
has (for once and for all), but it is a ‘this’, that is becoming, with new expressions and 
actions, different intensities, it is a ‘this’ and then it is a ‘that’, not just a this or that, but a this 
and that and that; every person is a life, not a this or that, not a this and that, but a this and 
and and and and.  A repeating with difference.  An open series.  They say it paradoxically, 
even a black has to become black: “One reterritorializes, or allows oneself to be 
reterritorialized, on a minority as a state; but in a becoming, one is deterritorialized.  Even 
blacks, as the Black Panthers said, must become-black” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987/1980, 
p.291).  It is a process with lines of flight, through with fixing blackness escapes, through 
what Deleuze and Guattari phrase as deterritorialization, an opening up of overcodings.  This 
is often difficult for minority groups, namely that their struggle becomes a form of 
overcoding, there is only ‘the black cause.’  In this context, Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 
p.11) formulate a suggestion for minorities: “We have to counter people who think ‘I’m this, 
I'm that’, […] by thinking in strange, fluid, unusual terms.  I don’t know what I am - I’d 
have to investigate and experiment with so many things in a non-narcissistic, non-oedipal 
way - no gay can ever definitely say ‘I’m gay’: It’s not a question of being this or that sort of 
human, but of becoming inhuman, of a universal animal becoming - not seeing yourself as 
some dumb animal, but unraveling your body’s human organization, exploring this or that 
zone of bodily intensity, with everyone discovering their own particular zones, and the 
groups, populations, species that inhabit them.”  Availability instead of ideality. 
 According to Deleuze and Guattari, all becomings are molecular, not a matter of molar 
subjects.  Becoming-woman is not an issue of a clearly defined molar entity (such as that 
woman), but of disappearing in the molecular collectivities (a woman among women).  The 
molar woman is too much the recognizable woman with her forms and organs.  Becoming-
woman is not imitating that image - endlessly reproduced in language and image, in daily 
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meetings and in media - or trying to transform oneself towards that image.  This doesn’t 
mean that, in order to regain their own organism, their own history and their subjectivity, 
women should not follow a molar politics.  It is the sound of ‘we women’ through which one 
emerges (textually) as woman.  But there is another step required, if one wants to avoid 
drying up: a molecular politics.  Virginia Woolf was alert to such a molecular level when she 
responded appalled when being asked if she was writing ‘as a woman.’  Rather, “writing 
should produce a becoming-woman as atoms of womanhood capable of crossing and 
impregnating an entire social field, and of contaminating an entire social field, and of 
contaminating men, of sweeping them up in that becoming” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987/1980, p.276).  Becoming-woman is then that the becoming itself is woman, just as it is 
not the child that is becoming, but becoming itself that is child.  A girl is thus the becoming-
woman of every sex.  One steals particles, speeds and slownesses; from the streams of 
sexuality to become a woman. 
Becoming anonymous, as second qualification of alterity, then refers to the modesty, the 
impersonal way of becoming.  Anonymity means a becoming without a totalitarian definition 
of the I.  Instead of having a personality - a molar entity, this qualification stresses the option 
of becoming individual among collectives, experimenting with many things in a non-
narcissistic way.  It goes against the dictatorship of having an identity.  Becoming other 
implies becoming anonymous, exploring the multiple possibilities without idealizing or 
choosing the safety of one specific form. 
 
Safe, social-cultural, spaces 
If becoming other requires the step of a molecular politics, the question is how this collective 
process can be approached.  Through connecting with the writings of Patricia Hill Collins in 
her book Black feminist thought, the concept of ‘safe spaces’ came forth.  Collins 
considers a Black feminist ‘standpoint’ a specialized thought, produced by African-
American women intellectuals.  This standpoint has several dimensions including “the 
presence of characteristic core themes, the diversity of experiences … the varying 
expressions… regarding the core themes and their experiences with them, and the 
interdependence of Black women’s experiences, consciousness and actions.” (Collins, 
1991, p.32).  Collins considers developing knowledge of the self as essential to Black 
 18 
women’s survival.  Unlike white women’s images attached to the cult of true womanhood, 
the controlling images applied to Black women are so uniformly negative that they almost 
necessitate resistance if Black women are to have positive self-images.  Challenging these 
controlling images and replacing them by a Black women’s standpoint is according to 
Collins an essential component in resisting systems of race, gender and class oppression.  
She identifies at least three safe spaces in which efforts to find a voice have occurred: Black 
women’s relationships with one another, the Black women’s blues tradition, and the voices 
of Black women writers.   
A first safe space is formed by Black women’s relationships with one another. As 
mothers, daughters, sisters and friends, African-American women affirm one another.  The 
mother-daughter relationship is a fundamental relationship in the life of Black women.  
Mothers teach their daughters to survive in the interlocking structures of race, gender and 
class oppression while simultaneously rejecting and transcending these same structures.  
They show their children varying combinations of behaviors as ensuring their survival through 
protecting them in dangerous environments as well as helping them to go further than they 
themselves were allowed to go.  ‘Motherhood’ has thus specific connotations in the lives of 
Black women.  Mothering is not only an activity of biological mothers or ‘bloodmothers,’ it 
is also practiced by ‘othermothers.’  Grandmothers, sisters, aunts or cousins take on, 
temporary or long-term, childcare responsibilities for one another's’ children.  This brings 
along well-organized, resilient and women-centered networks.  Sisterhood is another 
important relationship, referring to the supportive feeling of loyalty and connectedness 
among one another, due to the shared feeling of oppression.   
African-American music as art has provided Black women a second safe space to find a 
voice.  Music has played a central role in their lives, resulting in the ability to “create with 
their music an aesthetic community of resistance, which in turn encouraged and nurtured a 
political community of active struggle for freedom” (Davis, 1989, p. 201).  Spirituals, blues, 
and the progressive rap all form part of a continuous struggle, which is at once aesthetic and 
political.  For instance, blues recordings represented the first permanent documents 
expressing a Black women’s standpoint, altering their illiterate condition.  These songs can 
be seen as poetry, as expressions of ordinary Black women, rearticulated through the 
Afrocentric oral tradition.  When Black women sing the blues, they sing their own 
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personalized, individualistic blues while simultaneously expressing the collective blues of 
African-American women.  The texts resist the externally defined and controlling images of 
Black women and focus on their independence and self-respect.  
The expression of a Black women’s voice in the oral blues tradition is also being 
supplemented by a growing voice in a third location, the space created by Black women 
writers.  Increased literacy has provided new opportunities for Black women to transform 
former institutional sites of domination such as research and literature into institutional sites of 
resistance.  Since the seventies, a community of Black women writers explores new themes 
and old taboos such as Black women are not allowed to leave their children, to have 
interracial affairs, have lesbian relationships or be the victims of incest.  Writing, and all its 
forms, literature, songs, essays, poems,… is a daily activity through which Black women 
articulate their self-defined views, be it with an intensive sense of community. 
Collins’ writings about safe spaces for Black women show us a valuable option of how 
becoming other can become possible.  The safety of spaces can create a culture of 
resistance against the dominant ideology and allows the exploration of one’s becoming.  
Collins further stresses the idea that regardless of the actual content of Black women’s self-
definitions, the act of insisting on self-definition validates Black women’s power as human 
subjects.  These safe spaces are further characterized by Black women’s relationships with 
each other, their family and community.  It is not through an increasing autonomy that Black 
women develop their standpoint but through their relationships and affiliation with each 
other.  Rather than defining themselves in opposition to others, responsibility for and 
connectedness with each other provide possibilities for becoming other.  Safe spaces, as 
third qualification, reflect a social-cultural process through which persons can develop a 
room of their own, a different voice. 
 
Empty public spaces of interaction 
The qualification of safe spaces nurtures basically what Putnam (2000) calls bonding 
relationships.  Some might object that these spaces contain only a limited interaction, don’t 
address issues of power and difference, and will not be sufficient to bring about fundamental 
social change.  The process of becoming will therefore also involve a process of 
democratising, or the possibility of developing bridging relationships.  The duality of 
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domination and suppression might become reiterated in how we understand the workings of 
a democracy, not as a result but as a process, as a democratising.   
While asking the question ‘how is democracy working?’ we relate to Giddens’ 
articulation (2000) of what can be experienced everywhere: there is a need for a second 
wave of democratizing that instigates the deadlock of democracy into a renewed, everyday 
practice: the democratizing of democracy.  Democracy is then not a technical or procedural 
instrument but forms a social phenomenon that is invented again and again in everyday 
practices.  This coincides with the second meaning that de Tocqueville proposes to address 
democracy: democracy as a form of life and a social texture instead of a political system and 
form of government (IJsseling, 1999).  In the view of de Tocqueville, what matters in a 
democracy, is an ‘égalité des conditions’, an equality of chances and possibilities for 
everyone (IJsseling, 1999).  This is how we can see whether democracy works: can 
everyone participate to societal life in a more or less equal way without ending up in 
collectivism?  According to de Tocqueville, the danger that we all become ‘the same’ 
through social pressure and levelling can become dismantled through decentralisation.  Such 
a decentralisation involves a maximal division of responsibilities, stimulation of community 
life, press freedom and religion.  Though these conditions of decentralization can be 
acknowledged as relevant for the working of a democracy, one should not underestimate 
the issue of totalitarism (Lefort, 1981).  With Lefort (1981) and IJsseling (1999), we can 
make the democratizing of democracy more precise as it requires an empty space, limited 
power and heterogeneity. 
 Firstly, one should specify that democracy is not just a matter of more equality in terms of 
dividing and sharing power.  Rather, it requires a fundamental change of power itself, as in a 
democracy power is not any longer embodied (IJsseling, 1999, p.138).  Power in a 
democracy is not localized in a visible person like the king in a monarchy.  A democracy 
creates an empty space, which constitutes democracy itself.  While this empty space implies 
an open space, a dialogical conversation in an open space is not self-evident.  There is 
always some improvisation necessary and a chance that things turn chaotic or unclear.  The 
empty space is thus both the strength and the weakness of a democracy.  There is a 
continuous tendency to ‘fill up’ this space, as can be noticed in the repeated calls for a 
strong or charismatic leader.  Besides this tendency to embody the space through leaders, 
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there is a propensity towards indirect embodiment by privatizing the space, by media take-
overs or by bickering partypolitics.  Every time the empty space disappears, one can point 
at some form of totalitarism, and a return to power in its old versions 
 Secondly, a democracy implies a change of one’s practices.  Voting (and its voicing) 
implies a necessary responsibility for everyone, meaning that one partly individuates through 
one’s right or duty to vote.  While voting, nobody is any better, or more accurately, nobody 
is able to overview the whole situation, and thus every vote (voice) is equal.  Someone’s 
power is always limited.  There is no ultimate (divine or supreme) authority.  One is literally 
sharing power, a practice that cannot without some form of dialogue.  When some are 
longing for total power, when others cannot let go of power, or when still others think they 
have a better overview than others (e.g. experts), then a democratic system starts to waver, 
and slips back into totalitarism.  Democracy is thus always paradoxical: one always needs to 
convince others to gain a place, but this can only be done when one allows simultaneously 
that these others have an opinion and a responsibility.  The rhetorical game of politics can 
thus never end up in a win-loss debate, which is many times just what people see happening.  
What counts in a democracy is the maximal inclusion of (different) points of view (as long as 
an opinion doesn’t want to exclude other one’s).  Democracy without opposition is not a 
democracy. 
 Finally, IJsseling (1999) remarks that according to Lefort (1981) democracy is not firstly 
a matter of equality, but of recognizing heterogeneity, non-unity, difference and 
indeterminacy.  According to Lefort, “democracy is ultimately a system that can accept the 
other in oneself, as long as this doesn’t imply the destruction of democracy itself” (IJsseling, 
1999, p.140).  Democratizing can only work with the acceptance of difference.  A politics is 
always interweaving differ-ing viewpoints.  This brings along some chaos, since there is no 
natural hierarchy among these views.  The democratic experiment then is to give all views 
equal changes to enter (rhetorically) the public space.  That this implies some kind of unity is 
according to IJsseling a kind of phantasm that always brings the danger of totalitarism: “The 
phantasm of unity, that is somehow present in the thinking of every democrat, is on the one 
hand a condition to do actively and effectively politics, and it is on the other hand a big threat 
to every form of democracy and an important origin of every totalitarian system” (IJsseling, 
1999, p.142). 
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Becoming other requires a process of democratising in which the public spaces are 
empty, open to different opinions and voices.  The public spaces cannot be taken a-priori 
but are open to possibilities for experiments from the margin.  This fourth qualification of 
alterity implies that parties can only ‘occupy’ the public space for just one moment and 
immediately empty it for others.  As Bauman (1999; p.202) summarizes, living together in 
the world of differences means that we need to “understand each other in the 
Wittgensteinian sense of understanding - of ‘knowing how to go on’, … but also how to go 
on in the face of others which may go on - have the right to go on - differently.”  
 
 
Conditions and Illustrations of an Alterity Politics 
 
Our purpose has been to qualify the concept of alterity in an open, multiplying way.  The 
qualifications we developed are: (1) becoming other is a becoming, taking difference as 
multiplicity; (2) becoming other is a form of becoming anonymous, a life via haeccity; (3) 
becoming other requires aesthetic, social, cultural collectives, forming safe spaces; and (4) 
becoming other happens through the continuous emptying of public spaces, avoiding power-
to-overtake.  As a way to further reflect on the notion of alterity, we relate these 
qualifications to the four critical issues of the diversity literature as well as discuss them as 
conditions for what we can sum up as an alterity politics. 
The reframing of ‘diversity’ along the qualifications of alterity is an inquiry to inscribe 
difference and otherness in a process of becoming rather than being.  As a consequence, the 
discussion of a broad or narrow definition, or the question whether one should include many 
or few categories is not the point anymore.  Defining is a form of representing, of being, 
making people always lacking an ideal, another.  The point is to allow people’s life to be 
connective, to participate in multiplicity, and to sneak out of the dualities into the middle, the 
in-between.  The question is not to be or not to be, but to be and to …  Following the 
notion of alterity, the discussion whether identity is stable or dynamic can also be 
questioned.  Of course, no identity is stable, but sometimes more stable than some relational 
perspectives suggest: categories can be hard-core.  The point would rather be to step aside 
of these overcodings, and to go against the race of uniqueness and identification, focusing on 
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a becoming anonymous. Such a becoming, woven in speeds and slownesses, is a matter of 
becoming intensive, rather than a matter of stable or dynamic.  The third debate issue on 
power and how to approach this notion, was addressed in our readings of democracy.  
Democracy requires a fundamental change of power itself, since power is no longer 
embodied.  Crucial is then not (to say) that people ‘have’ power - some dominate and 
others are oppressed-, but that we acknowledge that becoming a person takes places in a 
public, empty space: difference and (a phantasm of) unity are here needingly connected.  
Finally, the discussion on the historical context of diversity was connected with a concrete 
illustration of such a historicity or historical dimension: safe spaces that are in-betweens 
where creativity and new (cultural, social, aesthetics) forms are forming one’s becoming. 
 Our pragmatics raises then the question whether different actions are implied in these 
concepts of alterity.  Does a politics, a diversity policy, based upon alterity also consists of 
different interventions?  Such a question is a matter of Deleuzian pragmatics: does it work?  
And does it make a difference?  We consider the four qualifications of alterities also as four 
conditions for an alterity politics and for diversity policies.  By conditions, we mean 
possibilities to work from, conditio sine qua non, conditions which cannot work without 
each other, conditions without which nothing can work.  While presenting the conditions of 
an alterity politics, we discuss some interventions that attend to these conditions.  
The notion of alterity and its qualifications offers policy makers (in its broadest sense: all 
of us) the crucial reminder that we need to approach the other from the position of the other 
and not from a dominant reality.  We need to move away from the use of predetermined 
norms and ideals to which every person needs to conform.  Instead, a response to the other 
that indicates that this other will be approached in his or her own variety, is necessary.  Even 
more, a response to the other is needed which indicates the belief that everybody can make 
a surplus.  A first condition in trying to implement this type of policy is to think persons as 
becoming.  Becoming means a continuous experimenting without a final destination.  One 
never will be a woman, a low educated person or a deaf-mute person but one is always part 
of a becoming.  We recognize this thinking in projects oriented at the employment of lower 
educated persons in which the intervention of ‘trajectory-support’ is being used.  The idea 
of trajectory-support is one of individual coaching which starts from the abilities and skills of 
the person.  Instead of taking the norms or ‘ideal’ of higher educated persons, the coach 
 24 
offers a mentoring where each participant can develop his or her trajectory from their own 
standards.  Also, in the (earlier) examples of Black women, the idea is not to reach the 
musical or literary standards of established artists but rather to develop a language of their 
own following newly created visions that can even change the dominant standards. 
Becoming also means becoming anonymous.  Taking this as a condition of a policy, 
becoming anonymous implies that developing happens in a modest, humble way.  Becoming 
a so-called minority is not so much a matter of trying to achieve the options determined by 
the center of the system, such as reaching higher hierarchical levels for women, or rights to 
marry for gay people.  Of course, the norm-options should be available to each individual, 
but a policy of becoming woman or becoming gay means foremost creating spaces to 
discover their own particular zones.  One disappears in the molecular collectives.  In the 
examples of Black women, the collective is very crucial.  It is not important than one person 
shines on the scene, it is a collective movement where individual versions disappear in the 
black and anonymous movement.  A similar principle can be seen in gay and lesbian protests 
and prides.  Though many gays and lesbians look for very individualized expressions as a 
way to become noticed in their otherness, they simultaneously thrive on becoming 
anonymous in a pride march, adding colour to the multi-coloured pride-flag; or they like to 
be ‘just there’ in anonymous bars or clubs, disappearing while feeling special.  
The two other qualifications of alterity, safe spaces and empty public spaces, are two 
important conditions through which becoming anonymous can be made possible.  Policy 
makers can first of all create the necessary safe space in which individuals can develop their 
own voice.  Since safe spaces allow for the exploration of one’s becoming and the nurturing 
of bonding relationships, it is a crucial condition for diversity policies to consider.  For 
instance, in a project focused on recruiting and training migrant people for the catering, the 
HRM manager expressed the importance of these safety feelings as a continuous factor to 
consider.  The safety referred here to practical arrangements so that all participants, most of 
them were political refugees, were able to attend the 3 week tailor-made training.  Their 
short-term need for money in order to pay for transportation or to get through the weekend, 
their problems to get a bank account, their need for child care,… these might be considered 
‘just’ practical problems but for these persons they were crucial questions to be solved 
before they could participate in the project and could contribute with their culinary 
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experience to a colourful cooking.  Another example concerns language policies where there 
is a huge pressure for immigrants to learn the local language of their new ‘home’ country.  
Though this can be considered a reasonable request, one seldom hears simultaneously the 
confirmation that immigrants have the right to speak and develop their mother language.  
This language is their safe space to fall back upon as they are entering many new and 
uncertain spaces (not in the least the new language to learn).  This language forms also the 
main connection to their history; from which one cannot cut off anybody as one’s history 
forms a major potential for new openings and new becomings. 
The other condition that makes a process of becoming possible, involves the creation of 
public spaces.  A process of becoming requires a process of democratising or a process in 
which each party is allowed to enter the public arena, express their voice, and then empty 
the public space to make room for other voices.  Policy makers then need to attend to this 
condition and ensure that individuals can express their experiments in a public space.  An 
example of attending to this condition can be found in a project of a so-called concentration 
school, a school with more than 90% migrant pupils, trying to change its educational profile 
in order to attract Flemish pupils.  After 2 years of preparing, visiting other schools to 
explore different educational projects, and building networks in the local community to 
support their project, the school organized a press conference.  The press conference 
involved a school-song by the migrant pupils, a portrayal by the school principal, the 
presentation of the new educational profile by the teachers, and some stories told by local 
persons involved in some school activities.  This press conference was for the school team a 
public forum through which they could express their intentions and planned activities.  It was 
through making their project public - with mostly positive, some negative reactions - that 
they experienced renewed energy as well as a kind of permission to continue.  
Following alterity and its qualifications, an alterity politics and the many more localized 
diversity policies are in the first place oriented towards making difference possible.  
Conditions need to be put in place through which otherness is not overruled by the norm but 
is allowed to develop its own variety of options.  It is through safe spaces and public spaces 
that a difference, the other can explore its possibilities and express these to other parties.  A 
minority can then make a surplus, maybe also for the dominant other, but in the first place 
for themselves, from their own perspectives.   
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